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MAY A STATE TAX A FOREIGN CORPORATION?
Unquestionably the states may exclude foreign corporations so
long as such exclusion does not violate the Constitution of the
United States; also a state has the right to prescribe the condi-
tions on which a foreign corporation may continue to do business
in the state unless some contract right in favor of the corpora-
tion prevents or some constitutional right is denied."
In The Baltic Mining CoMpany v. Massachusetts the Federal
Supreme Court has recently reiterated and affirmed its former
decisions in this regard. In this case the petitioner was a foreign
corporation capitalized at $2,500,000. It was organized under the
laws of Michigan, where its mines and smelters are located, but
its financial offices are in Boston, and five per cent of its sales are
consummated in Massachusetts. The Mining Company claimed
that a statute .of Massachusetts, under which it was taxed one-
fiftieth of one per cent on its authorized capital stock, was repug-
nant to the Federal Constitution as an unlawful regulation of
1 Hammont d Pack. Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S., 322-343.; Southern Pac.
Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S., 202; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wallace, 410; Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet., 586.
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inter-state commerce; that it deprived the petitioner of the equal
protection of the laws; and deprived it of property without due
process by imposing a tax upon property beyond the jurisdiction
of the state. It should be stated, too, that the tax, in no case,
according to the statute, could be for a greater sum than $2,000.
(Mass. Stat., 1909, c. 490, Part III, sec. 70.)
The Mining 'Company based its claim under the decisions of
the Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (216 U. S., 1) and
the Pullman Co. v. Kansas (216 U. S., 56). In the former of
these decisions the Court said: "A state may impose any terms
it chooses as a condition of permitting a foreign corpokation to
do business, so long as it does not deprive the corporation of any
rights secured to it by the Constitution. A state may exclude.
The Constitution, however, guarantees to every corporation the
right to do inter-state business." This latter statement apparently
governs this case, and would support the contention of the Min-
ing Company, but this statement must be construed according to
the facts concerning which it was made. In Western Union Tel-
egraph Co. v. Kansas and Pullman Co. v. Kansas it must be
noticed that a tax upon their capital .stock is a tax upon their
business, which is, primarily, or to a great extent, at least, inter-
state commerce. The companies were organized for conducting
commerce between the states, and, within the states, also, to be
sure, but the inter-state and intra-state transactions are all carried
on together over property which extends across the lines of states.
The business of these companies is commerce, not the manufac-
turing, the purchasing, nor the selling of the articles of com-
merce. Thus a tax on all their capital stock is a direct tax upon
money and property engaged not only in intra-state but in inter-
state traffic, and of course is void. Unquestionably it should be
SO.
But the Mining Company v. Massachusetts presents a very dif-
ferent question. The corporation was not organized for, nor is
its business inter-state commerce, but it was organized for the
purpose of mining, smelting, and selling copper within the State
of Michigan and under the laws of Michigan. Hence it can only
enter another state on the terms which that state imposes; it is a
foreign corporation and comes within the cases previously cited.
The tax in question is after all not a tax upon property but an
excise tax upon the corporation. for the privilege of doing busi-
ness in Massachusetts and while it is based on the amount of the
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authorized capital stock, nevertheless there is a limit of $2,000
beyond which the tax does not extend. If, as is shown under the
cases cited supra, a state may impose such conditions as it sees
fit upon a foreign corporation seeking to do business within the
state, it can certainly require it to pay an annual fee of $2,000. If
the state can do that it can surely charge them less than $2,000
for this privilege when the capital stock is less than a certain
amount. The corporation must meet the conditions the state im-
poses or forfeit its privilege. As is said in Pullman Company v.
Adams (189 U. S., 420, at p. 422), "The company cannot com-
plain of being taxed for the privilege of doing a local business
which it is free to renounce".
2
It would seem that Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York 3 is
an authority in point. The case holds that the statute of New
York of May 26, 1881, imposing a tax upon the corporate fran-
chise or business of every corporation organized under any law
of that state or any other state, to be computed by percentage of
its entire capital stock, when applied to a manufacturing cor-
poration organized under the laws of Utah, but doing a small part
of its business in New York, does not regulate inter-state com-
merce nor tax property not within the state, and the remedy of
the corporation must be sought in the legislature, or by with-
drawal.
It is difficult to perceive how the taxing of the corporation for
the privilege of entering a state is a tax upon powers granted
under the commercial clause of the Federal Constitution. In the
present case the statute imposes no prohibition upon the trans-
portation into Massachusetts of the products of the corporation
nor upon the sale of them within the commonwealth. It merely
exacts a license tax from the corporation when it has an office
in the state.4
For a state tax to be inhibited by the Federal Constitution it
must immediately affect the efficient exercise of a Federal power
or else the states are denied the power to tax either person or
property.5
2 Allen v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 191 U. S., 171-182; Kehrer v. Stew-
art, 197 U. S., 60-67.
3 Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S., 305.
4 Pembina Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S., 181-4.
5 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S., 530-550;
Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall., 5-30.
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It is the commerce itself which must be burdened by state
exactions in order to constitute interference with the exclusive
Federal authority over it. A resort to the receipts of property or
capital employed in part at least in inter-state commerce when
such receipts or capital are not taxed as such, but are taken as
the mere measure of a tax of lawful authority within the state,
has been sustained. 6
Finally, the Pullman Co. v. Kansas and the Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Kansas cases hold that the court, looking at the
substance of a statute regardless of its form, will determine
whether or not the tax operates directly on inter-state commerce.
The statutes, in each of these cases, requiring all foreign corpora-
tions to pay a percentage of their entire capital stock, were found
to be a direct burden upon that portion of the corporate capital
engaged in inter-state' commerce and hence void. Those cases
differ from the present, however, in that both of them were cor-
porations directly and necessarily engaged in inter-state com-
merce. The impairment of their local business would impair
their inter-state business. Also the maximum fee required by
the Massachusetts laws is $2,000; this shows conclusively that
it is not a property tax, but, only, an excise so limited that it
cannot reach beyound a reasonable license fee.
In view of these former decisions it would seem that the
Supreme Court of the United States from the standpoint of ex-
pediency, reason and authority, has done well not to extend the
construction of the inter-state commerce clause to the limit urged
by the Baltic Mining Co.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE AFFECTING RIGHT OF TRIAL BY
JURY.
Is a statute authorizing the Appellate Court, in cases where, as
matter of law, a verdict should have been directed for one party,
but where, failing such direction, the jury has returned a general
verdict for the other, to enter up final judgment for the appel-
lant, unconstitutional, as an abridgment of the right to trial by
jury?
8 Flint v. Stone, Tracy Co., 220 U. S., 107; Providence Institution v.
Massachusetts, 6 Wall., 611; Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 142
U. S., 217.
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In the recent case of Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry.. Co., the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, speaking through Chief Jus-
tice Rugg, answered this question in the negative." An adminis-
trator was suing for damages for the death of his intestate, under
a statute authorizing such recovery from a street railway com-
pany, whose servants in the conduct of its business negligently
cause the death of a person not a passenger or an employee, "in
the exercise of due care."' 2 The uncontradicted evidence showed
that plaintiff's intestate ran in front of defendant's car because
he was frightened by a Chinaman whom he had teased and an-
gered. The trial judge refused to direct a verdict as requested by
the defendant, and the jury returned a general verdict for the
plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the refusal to
direct a verdict was error. But instead of sending the case back
for a new trial, they directed final judgment to be entered at once
for the defendant, by authority of the following statute:
"When, in the trial of a civil action, the presiding justice is re-
quested to rule that upon all the evidence the plaintiff cannot re-
cover, and such request is refused, and exception by the defend-
ant to such refusal is duly taken, and a finding or verdict returned
for the plaintiff, then if the defendant's said exception is sus-
tained in the Supreme Judicial Court, and exceptions if any
taken in said trial by the plaintiff are all overruled, the Supreme
Judicial court may, by rescript, direct the entry in the trial court
of judgment for the defendant, and thereupon judgment shall be.
so entered."3
Had it not been for the recent decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Slocum v. New York Life Ins.
Co., the point would not have called for further discussion.4 A
statement of that case therefore becomes necessary. The plain-
tiff was the executrix of her husband, whose life was insured for
$20,000 by the defendant company. The policy was styled "non-
forfeitable," and provided for a month of grace in the payment
of premiums, and even after that, if the value of the paid-up pol-
icy to date was not entirely offset by-loans to the insured from the
company, such surplus would be used, in the absence of notice by
the insured, as a further payment of an equivalent amount in pre-
1 102 N. E. Rep., 665.
2 St. 1907, c. 392.
3 St. 1909, c. 236, sec. 1.
4 228 U. S., 364.
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rniums on the original policy. The rules of the company, known
to the plaintiff and the insured, also permitted its agent to adjust
the payment of premiums, by accepting part of the amount due
in cash, and part in an interesf-bearing note of the insured. A
premium fell due on Nov. 27, and was not paid. On Dec. 27, the
last day of grace, the plaintiff applied for an adjustment, and
made the necessary cash payment, but the note was never signed
by her husband, who died four days later. Moreover, the paid-
up value of the policy had been entirely offset by loans to the in-
sured from the company.
At this point it should be noted that the foregoing statement
of facts, taken from the opinion of the majority of the Supreme
Court, was not based on a special verdict, but was expressly held
by that majority to contain all the facts, inferences, and conclu-
sions, which a reasonable jury could possibly, as matter of law,
have drawn from the evidence.
Yet the trial court, when this evidence was all in, refused to
direct a verdict for the defendant, and the jury returned a gen-
eral verdict for the plaintiff. On error to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, that tribunal found, as matter of law, that the verdict
ought to have been directed for the defendant. Acting, in ac-
cordance with the Conformity Act, under a Pennsylvania statute
essentially similar to the Massachusetts statute quoted above, it
then entered up final judgment for the defendant.5 On appeal,
all the justices of the Supreme Court were agreed that the trial
court should have directed a verdict for the defendant, on the
ground that all the facts legally inferable from the evidence
showed as matter of law that the plaintiff had no cause of action.
But five of the justices held that the act of the Circuit Court of
Appeals, in entering final judgment for the defendant in con-
formity with the Pennsylvania statute, was error, because that
statute contravened the Constitution of the United States,
which provides that:
"No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined, in any
court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."8  The minority, speaking through Hughes, J., de-
nied that this statute violated the Constitution.
Now it was admitted on both sides that this clause, quoted
above, and indeed the entire amendment dealing with the preser-
5 Penn. Laws, 1905, p. 286, c. 198.
6 U. S. Constitution, Seventh Amendment.
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vation of trial by jury, related only to the Federal courts. But
there is a clause in the constitution of Massachusetts, looking to
the presevation of the right of jury trial, which is sufficiently
similar to this Seventh Amendment to render the decision of the
majority in the Slocum case, if not binding, yet extremely per-
suasive upon the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the prin-
cipal case.7 It is therefore fair to say that Chief Justice Rugg,
in deciding as he did, followed the opinion of the minority in the
Slocum case, and in fact he admits as much. Keeping in mind
then the essential similarity between the Massachusctts and Penn-
sylvania statutes, and the fact that the law of Massachusetts
and of the United States are in accord on the subject of demur-
rers to evidence and the later motion for directed verdict, as is
shown in the cases cited in the note, it will be seen that a full dis-
cussion of the arguments pro and con in the Slocum case, and a
conclusion thereon, should also conclude the principal case.3
The argument of the majority in the Slocum case, briefly
stated, is that when the Circuit Court of Appeals entered up final
judgment for the defendant, after setting aside the verdict, it
was re-examining a fact tried by a jury otherwise than according
to the rules of the common law. They admit that in certain
cases even at common law the jury was dispensed with, and then
they proceed to distinguish those cases. As to motions for judg-
ment non obstante veredicto, and in arrest of judgment, they
point out that these were based on the total effect of the plead-
ings, and had nothing to do with evidence, or with disputed ques-
tions of fact. As regards motions for nonsuit, these always re-
quired the plaintiff's consent, and even when granted did not
make the cause res adjudicata. And in the old demurrer to evi-
dence the demurrant had to admit all the evidence of his opponent,
and reasonable inferences therefrom, to be true, and then a final
judgment was reached for one or the other. This, say the major-
ity, is obviously distinguishable from the modern motion for a
directed verdict.
The dissenting justices reply that while the effect of the old
demurrer to evidence and that of the motion for a directed ver-
7 Bill of Rights, Art. 15.
8 On demurrers'to evidetice, compare Copeland v. N. Eng. Ins. Co.,
22 Pick., 135, with Fowle v. Alexandria, 11 Wheat., 320. On motion for
directed verdict, compare Davis v. Maxwell, 53 Mass., 286, with the state-
ment of the majority in the Slocum Case, 228 U. S., 369.
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dict are quite different, yet both raise a pure question, of law. In
both, the judge must consider all the evidence of the opposite
side, with all reasonable infe-rences therefrom, as admitted, and
determine both its legal effect, and its sufficiency in law to sup-
port the issue,. Final judgment was entered on the demurrer to
evidence, and might be. reversed on appeal without a new trial.,
Without discussing nonsuits or motion non-obstante at all, here is
a parallel at common law to the present action of the court below.
In short, no disputed fact has been- re-examined, for there was
never anything here within. the province of a jury to try. The
minority opinion strikes at the very root of the matter, and its
logic is unanswerable, when it says:
,"If this court found that on the trial there was any question of
fact for the jury to decide, it could not sustain,, as it does sus-
tain, the Circuit Court of Appeals in reversing the judgment for
the plaintiff."
These arguments would seem to give ample support to the
opinion of Chief Justice Rugg. But it has been suggested that
there is a difference between a pure question of law, such as the
legal effect of evidence, and a question for the judge which may
be as to whether or not the evidence is sufficient to go to the
jury.9 As an example of the first is cited the case of Oscanyoz V.
Winchester Arms Co., where the Turkish Consul, having by
agreement with defendant company procured his government to
buy arms of them, sued for his commission."o There the evi-
dence showed a contract which was void as against public policy,
and is said to raise a pure question of law, on which judgment, if
reversed on appeal, might properly be entered up the other way
without a ne wtrial. But the Slocum case, it is said, is an ex-
ample of the second, for here the question was as to the suffi-
ciency of -the evidence, as certain, facts were disputed. And it is
claimed that such a question, while it is for the judge, is not such
a pure question of law that the Appellate Court has any right to
set aside a verdict upon it, and enter up a final ,judgment for
the appellant.
This suggestion, it will be observed, does not affect the prin-
cipal case, for there the question was as to the legal effect of the
uncontradicted evidence. Nor does it seem to -overthrow the
minority argument in the 'Slocum case, for the following reasons:
9 Illinois Law Review, p. 387.
10 103 I T. S., .261.
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Is there any inherent difference between the two questions,
what is public policy, and, what is sufficient evidence to go to. the
jury? One seems just as much a fact as the other, and both, to
be sure, require the exercise of sound reasoning power
, 
backed.
by long experience, for their proper solution. That is why they
have both been left to the judge. We arrive, then, at this para-
dox, that the only essential difference between law and other
facts is that human experience has shown it to be necessary that
the former should be dealt with by a man of special training-the
judge. This is well brought out in Professor Thayer's Prelimi-
nary Treatise on Evidence, where, after stating that, philosophi-
cally speaking, all law is fact, he concludes his discussion of
Law and Fact in jury Trials as follows:
"It seems plain that the doctrine of our common law system
which allots to -the jury the decision of disputed questions of ul-
timate fact, is to be taken with the gravest qualifications. Much
fact which is part of the issue is for the judge; much which is
for the jury is likely to be absorbed by the judge, 'whenever a
rule about it can be laid down'; as regards all of it, the jury's
action may be excluded or encroached upon by the co-operation
of the judge with one or both of the parties; and, as regards all,
the jury is subject to the supervision of the judge, in order to
keep it within the limits of law and reason."
The conclusion seems inevitable, that when a jury has ren-
dered a verdict upon a question which human experience, crys-
talized -in the common law, has marked out as a question for the
judge, it has so far exceeded its province, that an arbitrary re-
versal of its verdict by an Appellate Court cannot by an3y stretch
of the imagination be regarded as an infringement of that
province.
FORFEITURE FOR BREACH OF CONDITION IN INSURANCE POLICY.
In the recent case of Dolliver v. Granite State Insurance Co.,
89 Atl. 8, Me., it was held: that where the standard policy of in-
surance in question provided that the policy .should be void if the
premises should become vacant and so remain for more than
thirty days, without the previous consent of the insurer in writ-
ing, and a breach of this provision took place, followed by a sub-
sequent occupancy, the insured could not recover for a loss oc-
curring after the subsequent occupancy. The court construed
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the word "void" to mean null, of no effect, and decided that the
force of the provision did not depend upon an increase of the
risk but that the vacancy worked a forfeiture and not merely a
suspension of the risk so that the subsequent occupancy did not
revive the policy.
There is decided conflict in the authorities upon this matter.
In the first place it should be noticed that the cases which decide
that a breach of the condition will not work a forfeiture, where
the policy provides simply for notice to the insurer of any in-
creased risk and giving him the option to declare it void, are
clearly distinguishable from the principal case.' Again it is evi-
dent that cases holding, under the older form of policies, which
provide that a breach shall avoid the contract but also specifi-
cally state that the policy shall "cease and be of no effect so long
as the premises shall be used, etc.," that a breach only suspends
the policy during the prohibited user are no authority in opposi-
tion to the case under discussion.2  The contract as a whole
shows that the parties only intended a failure to comply with
the provision should cause the policy to be suspended so long as
the breach continued and no longer.3 Yet these cases are often
baldly cited to the effect that a breach of a provision stipulating
that the contract shall be void if not complied with will work only
a temporary suspension of risk.4 We see they stand for no such
proposition.
Now as to the principal case it would seem clear at first im-
pression that where the policy provides that upon breach of a
condition it shall become void there should be no recovery after
such breach though the loss is not due to the breach and occurs
after it has been repaired. This is the view of many jurisdic-
tions.5 The provision is a warranty in the nature of an express
Iroyce v. Maine Ins. Co., 45 Me., 168; Tiefenthal v. Citizene" Mit. F.
Ins. Co., 53 Mich., 306; Arkansas Ins. Co. v. Bostick, 27 Ark., 539.2 Lounsbury v. Ins. Co., 8 Conn., 458; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lawrence,
4 Metc. (Ky.), 9; Blood v. Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cush., 472; U. S. F. & M.
Ins. Co. v. Kimberly, 34 Md., 224.
New England Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 32 Ill., 221.
4 See Athens Mutual Ins. Co. v. Toney, 1 Ga. App., 492; Germania
Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 Ill., 599; Trader's Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 163 Ill.
256.
5 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, supra; Putnam v. Commonwealth Ins.
Co., 4 Fed., 753; Leggett v. Aetna Ins. Co., 10 Rich. (S. C.), 202; Wheeler
v. Trader's Ins. Co., 62 N. H., 450; German Anmer. Ins. Co. v. Humphrey,
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condition precedent and must be fulfilled before liability can at-
tach to the insurer.6
Certainly this is so when the provision is against insurance in
other companies. As was well said in an Indiana case, "The pri-
mary purpose of inserting (such) conditions is to protect the
company from the hazard of over insurance. * * * Conse-
quently, it aims to secure the continued vigilance and co-opera-
tion of the owner in preserving the property. * * * Whenever
the property owner * * * applies for and obtains a second pol-
icy, valid upon its face, with intent and purpose to carry the sec-
ond policy as valid insurance * * * he has therefore defeated
the whole policy and purpose of the condition."'7
Other courts, however, have assumed an opposite view. They
construe the word void as meaning voidable only and hold that
when the cause for forfeiture no longer exists the policy is re-
vived."
With this decision we cannot agree. Most of the reasons given
therefore seem to be founded upon some idea of doing "natural
justice" between the parties.9 An interpretation is thus given to
the contract which is not apparent on its face.
The rule of construction applicable to all contracts is that in
the absence of ambiguity there is no room for interpretation of
the meaning of words.'0
It is not within the province of a court to change the terms of a
contract, however harsh they may be, if in so doing the meaning
62 Ark., 348; German Ins. Co. v. Russell, 65 Kans., 373; Chester Co. Mut.
F. Ins. Co. v. Coatesville Shoe Factory, 86 Pa. St., 407; Georgia Homes
Ins. Co. v. Rosenfield, 95 Fed., 358; Stuart v. Ins. Co., 179 Mass., 434;
Hardiinan v. Fire Ass'n., 212 Pa., 383; Jersey City Ins. Co. v. Michol, 35
N. J. Eq., 291; Carleton v. Ins. Co., 109 Me., 79; Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v.
Coos County, 151 U. S., 452, 14 Sup. Ct., 379.
0 Mead v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 7 N. Y., 530.
7 Am. Ins. Co. v. Replogle, 114 Ind., 1.
8 Trader's Ins. Co. v. Catlin, supra; Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Cecil, 12 Ky.
Law Rep., 259; Obermneyer v. Globe Mut. Ins. Co., 43 Mo., 573; German
Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Fox, 96 N. W., 652; Born v. Insurance Co., 110 Iowa,
379; Insurance Co. v. Pitts, 88 Miss., 587; McGannon v. Ins. Co., 171 Mo.,
143; Athens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Toney, supra; Sunter Tobacco Warehouse
Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., supra.
9 See cases cited in note 7, supra.
20 Hoyt v. Ketcham, 54 Conn., 60; Nichols v. Mercer, 44 Ill., 250;
Noyes v. Nichols, 28 Vt., 159.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
is ignored. 1 Words are to be given their plain meaning unless a
contrary intent appears.1 2 In these policies we find it difficult to
discern any ambiguity. 'The word void does not mean voidable
in ordinary legal -parlance.
The Illinois court has said 'in substituting such a meaning:""
"That a recovery on a policy on a building * * * should be de-
feated because a gallon of gasolene was there!in kept and used
* * *- does not coimmend itself as a reasonable rule." Where is
the limit to be fixed, then? Surely the keeping of 2,000 gallons
should preclude recl6v&'y, or of 200. Each case cannot be de-
cided upon its individual merits.
In a recent Georgia case the View of these courts was thus ex-
pressed :14 "When: words of the policy are that the insurance
shall be void if the premises * * -* shall be vacant, the meaning
is simply that if a loss occurs during the prohibited vacancy the
policy is void"; that," it is unjust to hold that a condition that in
no wise contributed to the loss should work a forfeiture of the
insurance," and that,"'the purpose of the clause is to protect the
insurer from the risk of non-occupation:"
This construction does not appeal to the reason. As we have
shown, the purpose of such provisions is not only that stated by
this court, but also to ensure care on the part of the insured. But
apart from the practical side of the matter, the parties have a
right to make such contracts, keeping within constitutional limi-
tations and not offending public policy, as they please. They en-
ter-into contracts, as far as-the law is-concerned, advisedly. If
the insured cannot bring himself within the terms of the policy he
has accepted why should the court relieve him? To hold other-
wise is to make a contract for .parties which they never made
themselves.' 5 This the courts have no power to do. rt is the
exercise of such power that raises the cry against judicial legis-
lation. Upon what principle can the courts revive a policy which
by its terms was null and void? 6 We know of none.
"Languier v..White, 29 La. Ann., 156; Louber v. LeRoy, 2 Sandf.,
202.
12 Griswold v. Sawyer, 56 Hun., 12; Moran v. Prather, 23 Wall., 492;
Thellusson v. Rendleshain, 7 H. L. Cas., 429.
is Trader's Ins. Co. v. Catlin, supra.
14 Athens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Toney, supra.
15 Imperial F. Ins. Co. v. Coos County, supra.
10Reynolds v. Ins. Co., 107 Md., 110; see Bemnis v. Ins. Co., 200 Pa.,
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This is not a question of whether there has been a breach of
the essence of the contract. It is a question of what the parties
have said. It may be freely admitted that the rule contended for
will in some cases work hardship. Nevertheless, in the sum
total of cases greater justice will be done-by holding the parties
to the intendment of their statements than by applying a rule of
so-called "natural justice." Such expeditions into the realm of
moral obligation invariably end in confusion in -the 'law and un-
certainty in business affairs.' It is submitted that the holding of
the principal "case is correct.
ADEQUACY -OF PROVOCATION"'IN HOMICIDE TO REDUCE TI'HE CRIME
FROM MURDER TO MANSLAUGHTER.
In the case of The State .v. Budnamo;' the defendant, while
with a party of drunken-men and women in.a brothel, shot and
killed a woman. "The State introduced a confession of the ac-
cused in evidence, in 'which he "tated .that the woman whom he
killed slapped him in the. face just before the shootifig, that he
was drunk,.and thought they .wanted tokill.him, and shot only to
scare them." The trial court in its charge to the jury said-: "As
this case has been presented -to you, no construction of the evi-
dence open to you discloses either legal justification, or excuse;
the only crime involved in your.deliberations is that.of murder. * * *
You start, as I have said, with a killing which amountsto -murder
-that is, a killing characterized by malice aforethought, either
express or implied."
On appeal by, the defendant, Justice Thayer, in delivering the
opinion of the court ordering anew trial, said: "The part of the
confession tending to show that the shooting was accidental :or
-done in hot blood.upon reasonable'provocation, presented matters
which were clearly for the jury's consideration, if the claim had
been made that the .shooting was accidental or done under cir-
cumstances which extenuated the crime. * * * The court, by its
charge, said in effect that it was not evidence, and withdrew it
from the jury.'
It may be that the court was right as to there being evidence of
an accidental killing, but.that-a slap in the face at the hands of
17 See Vance on Insurance, p. 433, and Richards on Insurance, p. 309.
187 Conn., 285.
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a woman constitutes such reasonable provocation as to reduce
the grade of a homicide from murder to manslaughter, we do not
agree.
Reasonable or adequate provocation is such as would naturally
and instantly produce in the mind of a person ordinarily consti-
tuted the highest degree of exasperation, rage, anger, sudden re-
sentment, or terror, rendering the mind incapable of cool reflec-
tion, and thus negativing the inference of malice drawn from the
fact of homicide.2 A technical assault, if of a trivial nature, will
not reduce the grade, where the 'retaliation is outrageous in its
nature, and beyond all proportion to the provocation.3 An as-
sault need not, however, be so violent as to put the defendant in
imminent danger of death; nor of such grievous bodily injury
as might reasonably cause death.4
There are two English cases of interest in this connection;
one, tending to support the principal case; the other, opposed to
it. In one case,5 the prisoner was indicted for the murder of his
wife, who had returned home and received forgiveness after hav-
ing lived with another man in adultery. Shortly after her return
she violently abused her husband, taunted him with her prefer-
ence for the other man, who had died, and becoming very violent,
finally broke away from two other women who had been holding
her, and spat at her husband's face-the evidence does not show
whether she actually spat upon him-repeating with much foul
language, her expressions about the other man. Thereupon the
prisoner stood up and gave his wife a mortal wound in the neck
with a sharp-pointed pocket-knife. The court left the question
whether the words spoken, and the other circumstances, aggra-
vated the provocation given by the assault, so as to make it a
serious assault and reduce the crime to manslaughter, to the jury,
which returned a verdict of manslaughter. It is doubtful, how-
ever, whether the question would have been left to the jury had
2 bldge v. State, 58 Ala., 406; Holmes v. State, 88 Ala., 26; People v.
Bruggy, 93 Cal., 476; Swaner v. State, 58 S. W. (Tex.), 72; Reg. v.
Welsh, 11 Cox C. C., 336.
3 Stewart v. White, 78 Ala., 436; State v. Emory, 58 Atl. (Del.), 1036;
State v. Anderson, 4 Nev., 265; State v. Barfield, 30 N. C., 344; State v.
Ferguson, 2 Hill (S. C.), 619; Honesty v. Com., 81 Va., 283; Rex. v.
Lynch, 5 C. & P., 324.
4 Williams v. State, 107 Ga., 721; English v. State, 95 Ga., 123; Cook
v. Com., 4 Ky. L. R., 31; State v. Sizemore, 52 N. C., 206.
5Reg. v. Smith, 4 F. & F., 1066.
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it not been for the vile language accompanying the technical as-
sault. At best, the case is an extreme one.
In the other case,' upon provoking words being used by a sol-
dier to a woman, she gave him a box on the ear, and the soldier
immediately gave her a blow with the pommel of his sword on
the breast, and then ran after her and stabbed her in the back.
This was at first deemed murder; but it afterwards appearing
that the blow given to the soldier was with an iron patten, and
that it drew a great deal of blood, the offense was held to have
been manslaughter only. This case -cannot be said to support the
Connecticut court, for the crime was deemed murder until it ap-
peared that the woman had seriously wounded the soldier by
means of a weapon. Even in its later aspect, the correctness of
the holding has been doubted by an eminent American jurist: "If
a man should kill a woman or a child for a slight blow, the
provocation would be no justification; and I very much question
whether any blow inflicted by a wife on her husband would bring
the killing of her below murder. Under this view of the law I
have always doubted Stedman's case. * * * Where a blow is cruel
or unmanly, the provocation will not excuse it."
To determine the sufficiency of the provocation to mitigate the
killing from murder to manslaughter, the instrument or weapon
with- which the homicide was effected must be taken into consid-
eration; for if it was effected with a deadly weapon, the provo-
cation must be great indeed to lower the grade of the crime from
murder;.the instrument employed must bear a reasonable propor-
tion to the provocation to reduce the offense to manslaughter.8 It
will be observed that in the first case above referred to, the crime
was committed with a pocket knife; in the second, with a sword.
Both were instruments ordinarily in the hands of the defendants
and their use as weapons was devised in sudden passion. But in
the case under discussion, the killing was done with a revolver
carried by the accused; and a revolver is not carried by the ordi-
nary man under ordinary circumstances. This alone is sufficient
to distinguish it and to require evidence of great provocation in
)rder to reduce the grade of the crime.
6 Stedman's Case, Fost., 292.
7 Chief Justice Gibson in Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. St., 264, 268; Wharton
on Criminal Law, §971; see also State v. Kloss, 117 Mo., 591; State v. Fer-
guson, supra.
8 State v. Shippey, 10 Minn., 223, 230; State v. Ferguson, supra; Rex
v. Thomas, 7 C. & P., 817; May on Crininal Law, §227.
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There is, however, further ground for disagreeing with the
opinion of the court. Buonomo, in his confession, stated that he
"shot only to scare". This in itself refutes any theory of actual
provocation or passion.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the reversal, in so far as
it stands upon the ground that there was evidence of reasonable
provocation, was erroneous. While the capacity of the ordinary
man to withstand provocation is the criterion where there was
in fact provocation,9 yet where the. accused was not actually pro-
voked, the fact that an ordinary man might have been provoked
to do the same act is of no consequence.
BREAKING AS AN ELEMENT IN BURGLARY.
Burglary at common law is the breaking and entering the dwell-
ing house of another in the night-time with intent to commit some
felony therein, whether the intent be executed or not.' By statute
it is practically universal now to make a breaking and entering
into any building, boat, or car a crime of similar gravity to com-
mon law burglary.
In some of the states statutory enactments defining burglary
have eliminated the breaking as a necessary element of the crime,
2
other states have by statute adopted the common law definition
of the crime to the extent of making the breaking an essential
part.3 In these fatter states there is the same necessity which
arises under the common law of determining what acts are neces-
sary to constitute a breaking.
It has been held apparently universally that an entry through
an open door, window, or other aperture is not burglary.4
DJudge v. State, supra; State v. Walker, 50 La. Ann., 420; State v.
Hoyt, 13 Minn., 132; Gardner v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R., 19; Reg. v. Welsh,
supra...
'I Hale P. C., 358, 559; Hawk. P. C., c. 38; Martin v. State, 1 Tex.
App., 525; Clarke v. Com., 25 Gratt. (Va.), 908.
2 Cal. Penal Code, sec. 459; Rev. Laws of Nev., sec. 6634; N. C. Stat-
utes, Rev. of 1905, sec. 3332.
8 Conn. Gen. Stat., secs. 1194, 1195, 1196; Vt. Pub. Stat., sec. 5751; Ill.
Rev. Stat., 756, sec. 36.
4Miller v. State, 77 Ala., 41; McGrath v. State, 25 Nebr., 780; 41
N. W., 780; Rex. v. Spriggs, 1 M. & Rob., 357.
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It has also been held almost universally that an entry by
pushing open a door or window which is partially open is
not burglary.5 On the other hand, it is burglary to enter
by unlocking or unlatching a door or window, or even by push-
ing open a door that is shut but not fastened in any way,7 or by
raising a window or trapdoor which is entirely closed but held in
place by its weight only." It is burglary to enter by means of a
chimney. The degree of force necessary to effect the entry is
not of importance.10 The question is whether the place of entry
has been closed as much as the nature of things will permit, irre-
spective of whether after being closed it has been fastened or
secured in any way. If so closed, any entry by such place consti-
tutes a breaking."-
The need of a clear distinction to determine what is to be held
burglary and what not, is apparent. The great majority of the
cases hold the further opening of a partly opened door or window
is not an act which amounts to a breaking of the security of the
building, apparently upon th- ground that the breaking must be
the initial act impairing the security.'
2
5 Rose v. Com., 19 Ky. L. Rep., 272, 40 S. W., 245; Cont. v. Strupney,
105 Mass., 588 (the window by which entry was made had been left open
a quarter of an inch) ; State v. Wilson, 1 N. J. L., 439; Rex. v. Smith, I
Moody C. C., 178. But see contra, Claiborne v. State, 113 Tenn., 261, 83
S. W., 352, 68 L. R. A., 859; People v. White, 153 Mich., 617, 117 N. W.,
161, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1102; State v. Sorenson, 138 N. W. (Ia.), 411;'
State v. Lapoint, 88 Atl. (Vt.), 523.
0 State v. Moore, 117 Mo., 395; 22 S. W., 1086; State v. O'Brien, 81
Ia., 93, 46 N. W., 861.
7 Kent v. State, 84 Ga., 438, 11 S. E., 355.
8 State v. Herbert, 63 Kan., 516, 66 Pac., 235.
0 Donohoo v. State, 36 Ala., 281; State v. Willis, 52 N. C., 190.
10 Walker v. State, 63 .Ala., 49; Timmons v. State, 34 Ohio St., 426.
11 1 Hawk P. C., c. 38, sec. 4; 1 Hale P. C., 552.
12 Sir William Blackstone in his Commentaries, Book 4, sec. 226, gives
as the reason for the rule that entry by means of a partially opened door
or window is not such a breaking as to. constitute burglary, that it was
"the folly and negligence" of the person in leaving his doors and win-
dows open. Many of the cases have given the negligence of the house
owner as the reason for the distinction. Pines v. State, 50 Ala., 153; State
v. Boone, 35 N. C., 244. Such reasoning is contrary to the well settled
rule that contributory negligence is not an answer to a criminal charge.
Belk v. People, 125 Ill., 584, 17 N. E., 744; Crum v. State, 64 Miss., 1, 1 So.,
1; Reg. v. Kew, 12 Cox C. C., 355.
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Since the breaking is a necessary element of the crime, the rule
that when an entry is made through an open door or window
where no force is necessary to make the entry-that is, where the
opening is sufficient to admit of entry without need of further
increasing it-such an entry is not a breaking, seems technically
justifiable, although the moral wrong of such an entry is as great
as in any other form of entry. Now that the death penalty for
burglary has been abolished the necessity of restricting the scope
of the crime is largely done away with, and the rule which deter-
mines that burglary is committed when a closed window is raised
to effect the entry, but that no burglary is committed if the win-
dow be found raised the fraction of an inch at the time of entry,'8
has no longer as its justification the extreme penalty formerly in-
flicted for the crime,'1 4 and since the man who enters by further
opening a partly opened door or window is morally as deserving
of punishment as he who" enters by opening a fully dosed door or
window, the better rule, and the one towards which the latter
cases seem to tend, is that given in the recent case of State v.
Lapoint,5 holding that the removal of an obstruction which if
left as found would prevent an entrance, constitutes a sufficient
breaking, it being immaterial that a portion of the entrance was
already open.
In view of the almost universal practice at the present time of
leaving windows open for ventilation, the statutes abolishing
breaking as an element of burglary seem preferable.
Is Coi. v. Strupney, supra.
14 Rex v. Hyams, 7 C. & P., 441 note (a), 32 E. C. L., 577.
15 88 At. (Vt.), 523.
